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a b s t r a c t
We propose a formal definition of Wolfram’s notion of computational processes based on
iterated transducers together with a weak observer, a model of computation that captures
some aspects of physics-like computation. These processes admit a natural classification
into decidable, intermediate and complete, where intermediate processes correspond to
recursively enumerable sets of intermediate degree in the classical setting. It is shown that
a standard finite injury priority argument will not suffice to establish the existence of an
intermediate computational process.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Intermediate degrees
A central question of classical recursion theory is the existence of a recursively enumerable (r.e. ) but undecidable set
A with the property that the halting problem cannot be solved even if A is added as an oracle to a Turing machine. Post
asked whether such intermediate sets exist, and initiated a program to establish the existence of such a set. Post’s efforts
produced a number of interesting concepts such as simple, hypersimple and hyperhypersimple sets, but failed to produce
an intermediate set.
Post’s problem is best phrased in terms of degrees of unsolvability, a notion introduced in two important papers by Post
[37] and Kleene and Post [23]. The object of these papers was the study of the complexity of decision problems, and in
particular their relative complexity: how does a solution to one problem contribute to the solution of another, a concept
that can be formalized in terms of Turing reducibility and Turing degrees. Post was particularly interested in the degrees of
recursively enumerable (r.e. ) sets. The Turing degrees of r.e. sets togetherwith the order induced by Turing reducibility form
a partial order, and in fact an upper semi-latticeR. It is easy to see thatR has least element ∅, the degree of decidable sets,
and a largest element ∅′, the degree of the halting set. Post asked whether there are any other r.e. degrees and embarked on
a program to establish the existence of such an intermediate degree by constructing a suitable r.e. set.
The solutions to Post’s problem required a new technique, now called a priority argument, which has since become one of
the hallmarks of computability theory. Interestingly, the technique was invented independently and nearly simultaneously
by Friedberg andMuchnik; see [13,34]. Our structural understanding ofR has grown significantly over the last half century;
see [47] for a slightly dated but excellent overview or [1] for a more recent account. The Friedberg–Muchnik result shows
that a four-element partial order with a least and largest element, plus two incomparable elements, can be embedded into
R. As it turns out, every countable partial order can be embedded into R. This fact leads to the decidability of the Σ1
theory ofR: in essence, aΣ1 sentence overR is true unless it is clearly contradictory. According to a theorem by Sacks, the
partial order of the r.e. Turing degrees is dense: whenever A <T B for two r.e. sets A and B there is a third r.e. set such that
A <T C <T B; see [41]. It is known that the ∀3-theory of R is undecidable; the status of the ∀2-theory is currently open.
Overall, the first-order theory ofR is highly undecidable [19].
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A few years ago, Wolfram [58] suggested that ‘‘. . . all processes, whether they are produced by human effort or occur
spontaneously in nature, can be viewed as computations’’. This assertion is not particularly controversial, though it does
require a somewhat relaxed view of what exactly constitutes a computation—as opposed to an arbitrary physical process
such as, say, a waterfall. Note Searle’s objections [42] against an overly simplified understanding of physical computation.
Wolfram then goes on to make a rather radical proposition, the so-called Principle of Computational Equivalence (PCE, for
short): ‘‘. . . almost all processes that are not obviously simple can be viewed as computations of equivalent sophistication’’.
The reference contains no definition ofwhat exactly constitutes a computational process, orwhat ismeant by sophistication,
so it is a bit difficult to take issue with the assertion. However, most recursion theorists would agree that the PCE coexists
uneasily with the well-established theory of the r.e. degrees. Wolfram’s response to such criticism can be summarized thus
[57]: ‘‘Any of the standard constructions of an intermediate r.e. set achieves precisely that, it constructs a particular r.e. set
that is undecidable yet fails to be complete. However, the construction as a whole, when interpreted as a computational
process, is very different from the set so constructed. Most notably, the process makes heavy use of universal Turing
machines and may thus well be complete when viewed in its entirety’’. As a concrete example, consider the standard
Friedberg–Muchnik construction which produces two r.e. sets A and B that are incomparable with respect to Turing
reductions and thus necessarily intermediate. However, it was shown by Soare that the disjoint union A ⊕ B is in fact
complete;, see [46]. If we were to implement the construction as a concrete device, say, a kind of pinball machine as
suggested by Lerman [27] for the infinite injury case, it is hard to see how this device could be construed as not performing
a universal computation. The corresponding computational process would indeed be complete.
The difficulty in identifying intermediate processes is closely related to another often observed problem with
intermediate degrees: all existence proofs of intermediate degrees are artificial in the sense that the constructed r.e. sets
are entirely ad hoc. This was perhaps stated most clearly by Davis [8]: ‘‘But one can be quite precise in stating that no one
has produced an intermediate r.e. degree about which it can be said that it is the degree of a decision problem that had been
previously studied and named’’. More recently, Ambos-Spies and Fejer, in [1], are equally forceful about the lack of natural
intermediate problems: ‘‘The sets constructed by the priority method to solve Post’s Problem have as their only purpose to
be a solution. . . . Thus it can be said that the great complexity in the structure of the c.e. degrees arises solely from studying
unnatural problems’’. Nonetheless, results from degree theory have been transferred to other areas. For example, Boone [3]
has shown how to construct a finitely presented group whose word problem has a given, arbitrary r.e. degree. Of course,
the translation itself is entirely unsuspicious; it is only the instantiation required in particular to produce intermediate
degrees that is unsatisfactory. In a similar vein, it was shown by Feferman that derivability in a formal theory fully reflects
the structure of the r.e. degrees: for every r.e. degree d there is an axiomatizable theory whose collection of theorems has
degree exactly d; see [10]. For a more recent and more complicated application of degree theory to differential geometry,
see Soare’s contribution to the proof of Gromov’s theorem [48].
There appears to be a fairly strong connection between the lack of natural intermediate degrees and the PCE. Indeed,
any of Davis’ previously studied and named decision problems could presumably be translated into an intermediate
computational process. For example, following a suggestion by Friedman, suppose one can identify a simple formula ϕ
of, say, Peano arithmetic such that Th(ϕ) has intermediate degree. Any standard enumeration of all theorems provable from
ϕ would then constitute an intermediate computational process. Of course, at present no one knows how to construct such
a formula.
It is interesting to note that in the realm of generalized recursion theory different answers to Post’s problem appear.
For example, in β-recursion theory the existence of an intermediate set depends on various properties of the limit ordinal
β; see [14–16]. For infinite-time Turing machines, the answer depends on details of the underlying definitions, notably
whether one considers single points or sets of reals; see [18]. In a more algebraic spirit, the Blum–Shub–Smale (BSS) model
of computations over the reals admits a surprising explicit solution for Post’s problem; see [32]: the set of rationals is
intermediate in the BSS model. Of course, none of these examples seems to have any conceivable bearing on a physics-like
model of computation.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a plausible definition of a computational process and to study the existence of
intermediate processes in this framework. In Section 2,we give a definition that ismodeled closely on discrete dynamics, and
in particular on cellular automata. We will show that some complexity results transfer over to the computational process
point of view,while others do not. In Section 3, we consider directly finite injury priority arguments, the traditional source of
intermediate r.e. sets. Aswewill see, at least the standardminimal construction fails to produce an intermediate process.We
discuss possible further directions and open problems in the last section. To keep this paper reasonably short, wewill refrain
from introducing standard concepts and notation from recursion theory and refer the reader to texts such as [38,47,7].
2. Computational processes and observers
It stands to reason that any definition of a computational process in Wolfram’s sense should capture some aspect of a
physical computation rather than the purely logical structure of such a computation as expressed, say, by Kleene’s schemata.
Indeed, the following observation is attributed to David Deutsch: ‘‘The theory of computation has traditionally been studied
almost entirely in the abstract, as a topic in pure mathematics. This is to miss the point of it. Computers are physical objects,
and computations are physical processes. What computers can or cannot compute is determined by the laws of physics
alone, and not by pure mathematics’’. Many mathematicians would probably take exception to this view, and indeed there
K. Sutner / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 183–190 185
is a bit of a culture clash betweenphysicists andmathematicians; see for example [4]. Yet Deutschmakes an important point:
the kinds of computations that can be physically realized, at least in the context of some idealized model of physics, are not
well represented by the purely mathematical theory of computation. Alas, Hilbert’s challenge to find an axiomatization of
physics is still unanswered aftermore that a century, so it is difficult to address precisely all physical aspects of computation.
Note that feasibility is not an issue here: we are not concernedwith computations that could be accomplishedwithin certain
space, time or energy bounds such as the ones that prevail in our physical universe. Rather, we assume an unlimited supply
of memory and unbounded time, as is implicit in the abstract theory of computation, as opposed to the fine-grained analysis
of computational complexity theory.
Early work in computability theory is notoriously formal and terse, but Turing [54] and Post [37] provide a clear path
towards physical representations of computations. First, Turing machines could be realized as physical systems (though,
for reasons of efficiency, other models of computation are preferable when it comes to design of actual digital computers).
Second, Post’s emphasis of r.e. sets as collections of natural numbers that are constructed in stages lends itself easily to
physical realization: we clearly could construct a device that generates the elements of an arbitrary r.e. set one after the
other in the sense that it will construct the physical representations of these elements.
From the proof-theoretic perspective, it is known that P− + IΣ0 + BΣ1, a weak fragment of Peano arithmetic, suffices
to prove the Friedberg–Muchnik theorem and thus the existence of intermediate sets; see [5]. This system contains the
usual axioms for addition, multiplication and exponentiation, but induction is restricted toΣ0 formulae. Furthermore,Σ1-
collection is also allowed: the application of a computable (i.e.,Σ1-definable) function to a finite set produces another finite
set. It would be difficult to imagine that any of these axioms collide with the laws of physics. For example, one can realize
the computation of a Σ1-definable function as a search process where the search space consists of the representations of
the natural numbers, presumably a collection of simple physical objects that can be generated on demand. Σ1-collection
can then be realized by constructing a finite collection of image objects under a Σ1-definable function, perhaps by placing
their representations into a certain bounded region of space.
Here we are not interested in entering into an ontological discussion about the relationship between physics and
mathematics; see for example [35] for a definition of a typed structure built on top of the reals that he claims to coincide
with the realm of ‘‘mathematical objects that have a potential for direct physical interpretations’’. Nor are we interested
in recent suggestions that certain realizable physical constructs might be used to break through the ‘‘Turing barrier’’. For
example, it has been proposed that a neural net might be used to solve the halting problem, [45]. In reality, it would seem to
take considerable effort to make neural nets perform any computations in the recursion-theoretic sense; see [30], where it
is shown that in the presence of Gaussian noise neural nets cannot even recognize all regular languages. We refer the reader
to Davis’ excellent paper [9] for a comprehensive discussion of these ideas.
In the absence of a solution to Hilbert’s sixth problem, one can only hope to establish some general principles that seem
to apply to all physical computations. Perhaps the most far-reaching attempt in this direction is Gandy’s formulation of four
fundamental principles that describe a very general model of parallel computation; see [17] and also [43,44]. Gandy’s goal is
to establish his ‘‘ThesisM’’,which states that everything that can be computed by amachine can also be computed by a Turing
machine. The model is based on hereditarily finite sets over a countable set of indistinguishable urelements, corresponding
to elementary components of a computational device such as atoms or other particles. In the reference, Gandy gives a long
list of counterexamples that demonstrate that his conditions cannot be further relaxed: any conceivable modification leads
to machines that ‘‘display free will’’, i.e., that can compute any number-theoretic function.
To avoid the significant technical difficulties of Gandy’s approach we will stay closer to Zuse’s and Fredkin’s idea,
adopted byWolfram [59,12,58], but discouraged byMycielski, of modeling physics by some type of cellular automaton. As a
consequence, we are dealing with countable and locally finite structures. It is easy to see that all these automata conform to
Gandy’s principles. A cellular automaton is a continuous shift-invariant map on a Cantor space of the formΣZ
d
, whereΣ is
some finite alphabet. For our purposes, it is convenient to consider the one-dimensional case d = 1. Of course, more realistic
models with abundant conservation properties such as Fredkin’s SALT automata [33] would employ higher dimensions, but
thiswould only complicate our arguments. Thuswehave a globalmapG acting onΣZ, the space of all configurations. A cellular
automaton has a finite description since, by continuity and shift invariance,G is induced by a finitemap g : Σw → Σ , where
w ≥ 1, the so-called local map of the automaton.
Note that G can be computed by a rational transducer operating on bi-infinite words. To avoid issues with higher-type
computability we focus on the subspaceΣZ0 of configurations X of finite support: suppose that 0 ∈ Σ and allow only finitely
many positions i ∈ Z such that X(i) ≠ 0.Wemay safely assume that the global map preserves finite supports. Hence we can
identify configurations with finite words over Σ . The one-step operation in a process will be given by functional rational
transductions, a slightly more general concept than the word maps induced by cellular automata. Clearly the orbit of any
configuration is then automatically r.e.
We can now propose a formal definition of a computational process. For our purposes, a computational process over some
alphabet Σ is a pair P = ⟨τ , X⟩ , where τ is a finite state transducer over Σ and X ∈ Σ⋆ is a word. We will conflate τ and
the map that it induces onΣ⋆ and refer to τ as the computor and to X as the initial configuration of P . Thus we can obtain a
sequence of configurations by iterating τ on X: Xt = τ t(X).
We need to explain how to extract information from this sequence. As Searle [42] points out, ‘‘Computational states
are not discovered within the physics, they are assigned to the physics’’. A physical system is not intrinsically a computer;
rather, it is necessary to interpret certain features of the physical system as representing a computation. Some processes
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Fig. 1. A partial orbit of elementary cellular automata number 30 and number 110.
lend themselves naturally to interpretation as a computation, but others may require interpretations of considerable
sophistication (e.g., the elementary cellular automaton number 110 from Fig. 1). The act of interpretation of a physical
system is performed by an observer. For our purposes, we define an observer to be aword function ρ onΣ that is computable
in constant space. We associate the language Oρ = {ρ(Xt) | t ≥ 0} with the observer. We refer to Oρ as the observation
language of ρ. It follows from the definitions that this language is always r.e.
The computor is narrowly constrained so as to make sure that a single step in the process is very simple and in particular
cannot hide complicated sub-computations. For example, the computor cannot perform a whole stage in a Friedberg–
Muchnik-type construction in a single step; see below. The observer on the other hand has the ability to filter out some
part of the current configuration and rewrite it slightly. Of course, there is always on observer whose observation language
is trivial. We are here interested in the case where the observer focuses on an interesting part of the computation. Since
we do not wish for the observer to be able to artificially inflate the complexity of the observation language, it is important
that the observer is strictly constrained in computational power. For example, suppose that we were to allow an arbitrary
primitive recursive word function to be applied to Xt . The observer could then ignore the input and simply launch an
independent computation of his/her own. In particular, as long as lim sup |Xt | = ∞ the observer could always produce a
complete observation language. Thus even an entirely trivial computational processwhereXt = 0t would admit amaximally
complicated observation.
We can now classify computational processes according to the complexity of the associated observations. A
computational process is undecidable if there exists an observer whose observation language is undecidable. Likewise, a
computational process is complete if there exists an observer whose observation language is r.e. -complete. The process is
intermediate if it is undecidable but fails to be complete. Thus, an intermediate computational process admits at least one
observer that finds the process undecidable but prohibits any observer from extracting a complete r.e. set.
AsWolfram’swork in the early 1980’s showed, careful visual inspection of the images obtained by plotting part of an orbit
(Xt)t≥0 as a two-dimensional space–time diagram can produce some measure of insight in the computational properties of
the system. For example, Fig. 1 shows part of an orbit of two elementary cellular automata, ECA 30 on the left and ECA
110 on the right. Here we have used the standard numbering system: for any integer r , 0 ≤ r < 256, we obtain an
elementary cellular automaton by expanding r in binary to eight bits r7r6 . . . r0, padding on the left with 0’s if necessary.
Then the three-bit local configuration abc is mapped to r4a+2b+c . For ECA 30, the patterns appear to lack any clear and easily
predictable structure. Indeed, this elementary cellular automaton has been used as a pseudo-randomnumber generator; see
[56]. The geometric structure of the orbit of ECA 110 on the other hand is rather surprisingly complicated, and there are lots
of persistent, localized structures. It is not inconceivable that, given proper initial conditions, this type of behavior might be
exploited to perform computations. This turns out to be indeed the case, as shown by Cook [6]; the proof is quite difficult,
however, and requires bi-infinite, albeit ultimately periodic, configurations. In fact, it would be rather challenging to present
this argument in a purely non-geometric way suitable by verification through a proof-checker. On the other hand, it is quite
straightforward to simulate Turing machines on finite configurations when one has control over the cellular automaton. In
particular, it is not hard to construct complete computational processes.
The power of a computational process comes from iteration: the relational structure Cτ = ⟨Σ⋆, τ ⟩ itself is
computationally trivial in the sense that it has decidable first-order theory; see [49]. We note in passing that this result
also holds over the full space ΣZ of infinite configurations when the transduction stems from a cellular automaton; alas,
the machinery required to establish decidability is quite a bit more complicated. Dimensionality is crucial here: no similar
result holds in dimensions two or higher. It was pointed out by Finkel that one can use methods from ω-automaticity to
extend this result to include various counting quantifiers; see [11].
Thus, undecidability requires us to consider whole orbits rather than just fixed size segments. In any system such as
monadic second-order logic or transitive closure logic that allows us to express the reachability problem for Cτ (‘‘Does
configuration y appear in the orbit of configuration x?’’), we should expect undecidable propositions in the general case.
Note that the reachability problem is trivially r.e. Also, if we think of the computation of the orbit as a computational process
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starting at x, there is an observerρ that can checkwhether a fixed configuration y appears, so reachability is easily expressible
in our framework.
Since our notion of computational process is motivated by cellular automata, it is worthwhile considering standard
classifications of these systems and how they relate to computational processes. Classifications of cellular automata are
more or less based on attempts to transport concepts from classical dynamics into the realm of cellular automata, perhaps
augmented by ideas from recursion theory; see [55,58,28,29,25,26]. As one might expect, from a computational perspective
these are all fraught with undecidability. For example, it isΠ02 -complete to determinewhether all orbits end in a fixed point,
it isΣ03 -complete to determinewhether all orbits are decidable, and it isΣ
0
4 -complete to determinewhether a given cellular
automaton is computationally universal; see [50,51]. It was suggested in [53] to turn this difficulty into a tool: one can use
the complexity of reachability to classify a cellular automaton in a much more fine-grained manner than usual.
To this end, define Cd to be the collection of all cellular automata whose reachability problem has degree exactly d,
some r.e. degree. Note that this is a significantly stronger condition than having a cellular automaton that is capable of,
say, enumerating a set whose degree is d: only a few of the orbits of the cellular automaton will correspond to actual
computations of the corresponding Turing machine (or whatever other computational model the automatonmay emulate).
It requires a bit of care to make sure that the other orbits do not violate the degree condition. At any rate, we have the
following result; see [52,53].
Theorem 2.1 (Degree Theorem). For every r.e. degree d there is a one-dimensional cellular automaton whose reachability
problem has degree precisely d. In fact, the cellular automaton can be chosen to be reversible.
Thus, thewhole complexity of the upper semi-latticeR of the r.e. degrees is fully reflected in this classification of cellular
automata. In fact, the situation is even a bitmore complicated:we can fine-tune various computational aspects of the cellular
automaton in question. For example, consider the natural confluence problem: ‘‘Given two configurations, do their orbits
overlap?’’.
Theorem 2.2 (Two Degree Theorem). For any two r.e. degrees d1 and d2, there is a one-dimensional cellular automaton whose
reachability problem has degree d1 and whose confluence problem has degree d2.
Of course, the two-degree theorem cannot possibly hold when one considers only reversible cellular automata: in this
case confluence of x and y is equivalent to x being reachable from y or y being reachable from x.
Needless to say, the proofs given in the references for all these degree-related results on cellular automata are based on
the existence of intermediate r.e. sets.More precisely, they employ somewhat complicated simulations of an arbitrary Turing
machine M by a cellular automaton that ensures that the degree of the reachability problem for the cellular automaton is
precisely the same as the degree of the acceptance language of M . If we were to reinterpret these arguments in terms
of computational processes, the process would have to include the simulation of a Turing machine with intermediate
acceptance language. It is these sub-computations that push the degree of the reachability problem up to the chosen degree,
and it is the overall construction using restarting Turing machines that keeps it from exceeding the target degree. Alas, it
is not hard to construct an observer that extracts details of the computation performed by M . As we will see in the next
section, at least for the standard choice ofM , this means that the computational process admits a complete observation, and
is thus not intermediate.
3. Observers versus intermediate sets
The choice of observer can be critical in determining the complexity of the observation. Consider a process that
enumerates all pairs (e, x) ∈ N × N such that x ∈ We in stages, using the standard dovetailing procedure. Whenever a
pair is found, the configuration # e# x#w ∈ #2⋆#2⋆#Γ ⋆ is generated, where z denotes the binary expansion of z and # is a
special separator symbol. Obviously one can design an observer ρe such that Oρe = {x | x ∈ We} ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ /∈ 2⋆ is
a default output emitted by the observer program whenever the current configuration is not of the proper syntactic form.
Hence, every r.e. degree appears as the observation of this process. Similarly, we can construct a computational process and
a canonical observer that produces any particular intermediate degree. Alas, in order to obtain an intermediate process we
have to make sure that all possible observers fail to produce a complete observation.
There are several variants of the finite injury priority argument due to Friedberg and Muchnik. We will here use a fairly
general framework due to Sacks that is based on effective Baire categoricity; see [39, Chp. 4] and [36, Chp. X] for background.
Sacks’ method separates the combinatorial aspects of the construction very nicely from the computability aspects. It seems
particularly appropriate for our purposes, since the construction produces a single r.e. set. In this setting, a requirement is a
family of pairs of finite sets
R = {(Ci,Di) | i ∈ I}
with the intent that the set T ⊆ N to be constructed should contain Ci but be disjoint from Di for some i ∈ I . Let
F : N → Pω(N) be a computable bijection and let ⟨. . .⟩ and (.)i be the usual coding and decoding functions. For any
set X ⊆ N, let even(X) = {i ∈ N | 2i ∈ X} and odd(X) = {i ∈ N | 2i+ 1 ∈ X}. As is customary, we often identify a set with
its characteristic function. Given a function E : N→ N , we can define the eth requirement (with respect to E) to be
Re = {(Fi, Fj) | ∃ s (E(s) = ⟨i, j, e⟩ )}.
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Thus, E is used to enumerate requirements. Note that if E is computable then Re is r.e. It is convenient to set η(s) = (E(s))2
and call s an e-stage if η(s) = e. When E is clear from context, we also write Cs for F(E(s))0 and Ds for F(E(s))1 .
In a moment we will associate a so-called priority set T ⊆ Nwith E; the definition of T is in ω stages s ≥ 0. Requirement
Re ismet or receives attention at e-stage s if Cs ⊈ T<s, Cs ⊆ T s and Ds ∩ T s = ∅. On the other hand, requirement Re is injured
at stage s if it was met at stage t < s but now Dt ∩ T s ≠ ∅. Thus, a requirement Re that is met at some stage and not injured
afterwards will produce a priority set that lies in the open set
Oe = {X ⊆ N | ∃ e-stage s (Cs ⊆ X ∧ Ds ∩ X = ∅) }.
Here is the construction in detail. At stage 0, set T 0 = ∅. Now consider a stage s > 0, say, an e-stage. The default action is to
set T s = T<s provided one of the following three conditions obtains.
• Ds ∩ T<s ≠ ∅.• There is an e-stage t < s such that Re was met at stage t and has not been injured since.• There is an e′-stage t < s such that e′ < e, Re′ was met at stage t and has not been injured since, but would be injured
now if Re were to receive attention.
In all other cases, we set T s = T<s ∪ Cs.
Intuitively, in the first case we cannot work on Re since the disjointness condition is violated (of course, we are not
allowed to remove elements from T ). In the second case we are on the way to achieving T ∈ Oe, so there is nothing to do.
The third case is really the heart of any priority construction: while we could enter elements into T to satisfy Re, we refrain
from doing so because the injury caused to Re is due to a requirement Re′ of higher priority. In this case we have to wait till
another possibility to meet Re arises, one that does not conflict with Re′ . Note that by construction T is automatically r.e. in
E. The key point is that the enumerating function T can be constructed alongside with T , so that E is computable and T is r.e.
Of course, there is no reason that all requirements would be met by this construction; however, all sufficiently well-
behaved requirements will be met. More precisely, a requirement Re is said to be E-dense if for every finite set A there is an
e-stage s > 0 such that
Cs ∩ A = Ds ∩ T<s = ∅.
The fundamental result due to Sacks [39] is then this.
Theorem 3.1 (Sacks [39]). Let E be a function enumerating requirements. Then the corresponding priority set satisfies all E-dense
requirements.
Sacks’ construction can naturally be translated into a computational process in our sense. This translation is
straightforward in principle but rather too tedious to be carried out in reality in any detailed manner (for example, by
explicitly constructing the transition table for the transducer). One possible approach is to first rephrase the construction
as a Turing machine and then to code the instantaneous descriptions of the Turing machine as words over some suitable
alphabet. Note that in this setting a single step in the computation can indeed be computed by a transducer. There are several
ways to deal with the priority set T . For example, one could mimic a write-only output tape by using multiple tracks and
write finite monotonic approximations to T into one of these tracks. The appropriate observer ρ can then simply read from
this virtual output tape. Of course, the observer could also inspect other tracks but, as we shall see, even just reading the
priority set causes problems.
It remains to show how one can construct an intermediate set in Sacks’ framework. In order to spoil a potential
observer that is trying to extract additional information from a computational process, it seems reasonable to rely on the
least complicated construction of an intermediate degree known. The following approach seems to satisfy this criterion.
Informally, we wish to construct two r.e. sets A and B that satisfy the ‘‘requirements’’
Pe : We infinite ⇒ A ∩We ≠ ∅
Ne : B ≄ {e}A .
Herewe follow Sacks in using quotationmarks to differentiate these conditions from the formal requirements spelled out in
the construction above. The first group of ‘‘requirements’’ ensures that A is simple and thus not decidable; the second group
guarantees that A cannot be complete, a fact witnessed by B.
Set A = even(T<s), B = odd(T<s) and e = (s)0. Now consider some stage s > 0. The default action is to set Cs = Ds = ∅
and η(s) = 0 unless one of the two following situations arises.
Case 1: (s)1 is even and there exists an x, 2e < x < s such that x ∈ W se .
Let x0 be the maximal such x and set Cs = {2x0}, Ds = ∅ and η(s) = 2e.
Case 2: (s)1 is odd and there exists a u, u ∈ ⟨e,N⟩ and u < s, such that {e}As (u) ≃ 0.
Let u0 be the minimal such u and set Cs = {2u0 + 1}, Ds = 2A and η(s) = 2e+ 1.
This completes the construction.
Clearly, E is computable since all the computations required at stage s are primitive recursive, uniformly in s. For example,
in the first case, E(s) = F−1({2x0}), F−1(∅), 2e+ 1 . Hence T and also A = even(T ) and B = odd(T ) are r.e. , as required.
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Note that, in case 1, the construction has uncovered a witness for Pe and tries to place this witness into A. In case 2, the
potential witness u to Ne succeeds in the sense that, at stage s, {e}A asserts that the witness is not in B. Therefore, we
place it into B and protect the part of A that is relevant for the computation of {e}As (u0). It is clear that if the corresponding
requirements are met, and not injured again at a later stage, we will have managed to establish our ‘‘requirements’’.
One minor complication remains: by Sacks’ theorem we only know that all E-dense requirements are met, it remains
to deal with non-dense requirements. For the requirements R2e, corresponding to the positive Pe, this is not an issue: the
requirements are trivially densewheneverWe is infinite. For R2e+1, corresponding to the negativeNe, we need to distinguish
two cases. First, if the requirement is E-dense one can invoke Theorem 3.1 to conclude that it must be met at some stage s,
whence {e}A ≄ B. So suppose the requirement fails to be E-dense. Then there is a finite set F such that for all (2e+ 1)-stage
s we have Cs ⊆ T<s or F ∩ Cs ≠ ∅. Now choose the least witness u ∈ ⟨e,N⟩ that is larger than max F . If u ∈ B then 2u + 1
must have entered T at (2e+ 1)-stage s via Cs = {2u+ 1}. But then Cs ⊈ T<s, a contradiction. Hence u /∈ B, and it remains
to show that {e}Ae (u) ≃ 1. If {e}Ae (u) diverges there is nothing to show, so assume that {e}Ae (u) ≃ 0. Then there must be a
(2e+ 1)-stage swhere Cs =

2u′ + 1, u′ ∈ ⟨e,N⟩ and u′ > u. But then we have again Cs ⊈ T<s, a contradiction.
In summary, the construction yields r.e. sets T = even(T )⊕ odd(B) that satisfy our informal ‘‘requirements’’ from above
and, in particular, an intermediate set A which can be obtained from T by erasing all odd numbers. However, the actual
construction is not at liberty to maintain only the even part of T . Hence, when cast as a computational process an observer
could also extract B or all of T . Unfortunately, this renders the process complete.
Proposition 3.1. The priority set T is complete.
To see this, note that the witnesses ⟨e, i⟩ associated with negative ‘‘requirement’’ Ne can be viewed as an S2-function
u(e, s) such that the limit u(e) = lim u(e, s) exists for all e. Initially u(e, 0) = 0 and u(e, s) changes value only when s is a
(2e+1)-stage at which R2e+1 is met. Observe that an odd number 2v+1 can enter T at a (2e+1)-stage only if v = ⟨e, i⟩ , i.e.,
if it is a potential witness set aside for the ‘‘requirement’’Ne. Thus, using T as an oracle, we can compute u(e). Now choose
a recursive function f that witnesses membership in the jump of A as follows:
e ∈ A′ ⇐⇒ {f (e)}A (z) ≃ 0 for all z.
Then e ∈ A′ ⇐⇒ {f (e)}A (w(e)) ≃ 0 ⇐⇒ u(e) ∈ A, so A′ ≤T T , and we are done.
Similar arguments seem to apply to all finite injury priority constructions of intermediate sets. In fact, it was suggested
by Jockusch and Soare in [22] that priority constructions obey a kind of ‘‘maximum degree principle’’ in the sense that the
construction of an r.e. set with weak negative requirements automatically produces a complete set. If the requirements are
strong enough to prevent completeness of the set there are still remnants of completeness in the construction. This type
of completeness is hidden in the standard recursion-theoretic argument since the ostensible output is obtained by filtering
the priority set, but becomes visible when we recast the argument as a computational process. Thus we have the following
result.
Theorem 3.2. The standard Sacks-style finite injury priority argument does not yield an intermediate computational process.
There are variants of this construction that produce stronger results. For example, Sacks [40] has shownhow tomodify the
construction so that A can be any given undecidable r.e. set, and we obtain S such that A ≰T S. Thus S avoids a whole upper
cone rather than just complete sets. Alas, as a computational process the construction requires us to furnish an enumeration
of Awhich apparently requires a complete process.
4. Open problems
We have proposed a notion of computational process that is motivated by discrete dynamical systems that provide a
physics-like model of computation. We have verified that standard finite injury priority arguments, when interpreted as
computational processes in this sense, produce complete rather than intermediate processes. In light of the Jockusch/Soare
maximum degree principle, it is difficult to imagine a variant of a priority argument that would circumvent this problem.
We conjecture that this obstruction is truly general.
A number of questions come tomind. First and foremost, is there away to hide information fromany observer so that only
the desired intermediate observations can take place? Recall that we require observers to be constant space computable.
On the other hand, the computor is likewise incapable of performing complicated computations in a single step, so it is
unclear whether relevant information can be kept from the observer. Second, it would be interesting to constrain the model
of computation that motivates our definition of computation process further in the direction of making it a closer match
to actual physical computation. For example, one could consider higher-dimensional cellular automata that are reversible
and in addition obey certain conservation laws, much in the spirit of Fredkin’s recent work on SALT [33]. The motivation
for Fredkin is the construction of physically feasible, three-dimensional systems that dissipate as little energy as possible.
It is conceivable that a narrow class of such systems could maintain universality while eliminating intermediate processes.
Of course, the existence of a ‘‘natural’’ intermediate degree would derail such efforts. It should be noted that the first-order
theory of two-dimensional and thus higher-dimensional cellular automata is already undecidable, so some additional care
may have to be taken to make sure that the one-step relation in a computational processes suitable to model such devices
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is sufficiently simple. Third, Kucera gave a priority-free solution to Post’s problem; see [24]. Their argument relies on the
low basis theorem due to Jockusch and Soare [21], whose proof appears to require universality. Moreover, it is not entirely
clear how to rephrase the entirety of Kucera’s argument as a computational process. Fourth, Marchenkov’s result in η-
hyperhypersimple sets provides another approach to the construction of intermediate degrees, though it is not clear how
this construction would avoid similar pitfalls to those of the standard priority argument. Lastly, one may question whether
our definition of computational process is indeed appropriate. Any attempt to strengthen the computor seems to permit the
existence of intermediate processes, albeit for the wrong reasons: the computor can hide essential parts of the computation
from the observer. Strengthening the observer is similarly difficult, since it tends to produce only complete processes, again
for the wrong reasons.
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